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Introduction 
Since the publication of texts in the 1980s relating to the food manufacturing and retailinO' ~ ~ 0 
sectors in the UK and U.S. (Burns et al., 1983; Marion, 1986), it has become an accepted, 
stylized fact that the food chain in developed countries can be characterized as a series of 
vertically inter-related input-output markets stretching from farm input suppliers through to food 
retailing. A dominant characteristic of the analysis conducted by agricultural economists in this 
area has been the focus on the horizontal structure and behavior of specific stages of the system, 
in particular food manufacturing and retailing. This research has either followed the 
structure/conduct/performance (SCP) tradition (see Connor et al., 1985), or, more recently, has 
been based on the so-called New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach which 
emphasizes the direct estimation of market power using structural econometric models (Perloff, 
1992). 
In contrast, a good deal less emphasis has been placed on analyzing the vertical aspects 
of the food chain. This is not to say that such aspects have been ignored. U.S. researchers have 
concerned themselves for many years with the issue of vertical coordination in the food chain, 
vertical coordination being defined by Mighell and Jones (1963) as: 
• .... the general term that includes all the ways of harmonizing the vertical srages of production and 
marketing. The market-price system, vertical integrntion. contracting and cooperntion singly or in some 
coordination Jre some of the alternative means of coordination.'' (p. 7) 
As the definition suggests, the focus has been on both describing the vertical structure of the food 
marketing chain, particularly for farming and first-stage processing, and also analyzing the 
coordination performance of the chain, where performance is judged in terms of whether a 
vertical marketing system delivers the right quantity and quality of goods to the right place at the 
right time (see Sporleder, 1992). 
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As well as the focus on venical coordination, there has been analysis aimed at explaining 
the nature and effects of the farm-retail price spread. Much of the work in this area has been 
conducted in the spirit of Gardner's (1975) seminal paper (e.g. Heien, 1980), and the most recent 
work in this vein has attempted to make a direct analytical connection between horizontal 
competition in the food manufacturing and retail sectors and the gap between farm-gate and retail 
prices (e.g. Holloway, 1991). In addition, there has been some analysis of the nature of bilateral 
market interaction between adjacent stages in the food marketing system. For example, Burns 
(1983) and Hamm and Grinnell (1983) have reviewed the nature of inter-relationships between 
food manufacturers and retailers in the UK and U.S. respectively, while Azzam and Pagoulatos 
(1990), Rogers and Sexton (1994), and Hyde and Perloff (1994) have focused on estimating the 
extent of oligopsony power in the food industry using techniques from the NEIO. 
However, apart from the above research, there has been little formal analysis of the nature 
of vertical contractual relations between stages of the food chain. Although Burns refers to the 
discounting to retailers by food manufacturers in the UK food chain, a practice investigated in 
1981 by the :Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), and McLaughlin and Rao (1990) 
have analyzed the product selection behavior by food retailers in the U.S., agricultural economists 
have not incorporated such aspects of vertical behavior into models of the food system, it 
generally being assumed that ±inns in the chain conduct their transactions through arms' :ength, 
linear price contracts. 
This paper considers those aspects of vertical market interaction which, while apparently 
widely used. have largely been ignored by agricultural economists. These are broadly termed 
vertical restraints and include, among others, the use of discounts (in various forms), slotting 
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allowances, exclusive dealing and exclusive territory(ies) arrangements. Tnere are perhaps four 
obvious reasons why such restraints may increasingly characterize the food system: first, the 
maintenance (or creation) of dominant market positions in upstream or downstream stages of the 
food system; second the appropriation of rents by one stage from subsequent stages of the 
system; third, control of promotional effort and ensuring efficient distribution; founh, competition 
between products for increasingly scarce shelf-space. 
It is only f:llrly recently that industrial organization theorists have explored the welfare 
implications of vertical restraints1• Unfortunately, while there is an extensive literature dealing 
with such restraints, it gives conflicting predictions about their private and social effects. 
Specifically, the theory generates results showing that restraints can either increase both private 
and social welfare or increase private and lower social welfare. Perhaps not surprisingly, this can 
lead to inconsistencies in public policy towards such restraints2• 
The overall purpose of this paper, therefore, is twofold. The first objective is to provide 
a selective review of the recent theoretical literature on various aspects of vertical market 
competition. Section 1 of the paper detines precisely what is meant by a vertical restraint, and 
outlines the basic method for analyzing such arr..u1gements, focusing on simple two-pan tariffs 
and other types of restraint. In Section 2, the analysis is expanded to consider more complex 
vertical structures and how restraints may be socially harmful. The second objective, covered 
1 Vickers ::md Waterson (1991) recently noted. " ... VerticJ.l relationships were once r:.uher a minority interest in 
industrial economics, as an examination of the older texts on your shelves (or the shelves of your older colleagues 
or teachers) will show. This is pruticul::u-ly true of the litenture on vertical restr:lints, which is appearing in texts 
only now, having been fonnruly developed since the mid-1980s. To be sure, these developments built upon earlier 
analysis and policy debate (for example about resale price maintenance in the UK), ...• but there was not the same 
degree or breadth of concern." (p.445) 
2 In this sense, the term "restraints" is emotive. and, as Bark ( 1978) suggests, has led to the anti-trust authorities 
pre-judging the effects of such vertical market practices as being negative. 
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in Section 3, is to review recent rulings on venical market issues in the food sector by the U.S. 
and lTK competition authorities. The aim of this is to assess both the extent to which the recent 
theoretical literature is a reasonable cho.racterization of vertical market competition in the food 
sector, and whether the competition authorities perceive different forms of vertical restraints as 
welfare-enhancing or otherwise. Finally, Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
l. Basic Analysis of Vertical Restraints 
(i) Definition 
Normally in economic theory the concern is with contracts that specify linear prices, i.e. 
there is a simple uniform posted price such that a buyer pays a seller an amount proportional to 
the quantity purchased. However, in vertical markets, rather more complex, non-linear 
contractual arrangements are often observed, which are generally known in the literature as 
vertical restraints (Rey and Tirole, 1986a). A number of such restraints are discussed in the 
literature (see Katz. 1989), legal or otherwise. Most commonly, these are: two-pan tariffs, 
which consist of a franchise fee and a linear price; retail price restraints, which relate to 
contracts where limits are placed on the price at which a retailer can sell a manufacturer's good; 
exclusive dealing and exclusive territories which are contractual provisions resnicting a retailer 
to carrying only one manufacturer's brand, and the geographical area of sales of that brand(s); 
full-line forcing which relates to a retailer having to carry the complete range of a manufacturer's 
goods, and the related activities of tie-in sales and commodity bundling whereby the sale (price) 
of one product is conditioned on the purchaser buying some other product (see Carbajo, de Meza 
and Seidmann, 1990; Whinston, 1990). 
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While the existence of such practices has been known for some time, as IViathewson and 
Winter (1984) note: 
"These restrictions have been a puzzle to economists, o. source of contention in anritrusr legislation. and a 
subject rebtively unexplored in economic theory." (p.27) 
(ii) Simple Two-Part Tariffs 
The modern theory of vertical restraints c~ be thought of as a particular class of the 
principal-agent problem (Rey and Tirole, 1986a; Katz), although the theory of vertical restraints 
goes beyond the usual single principal-single agent problem. Following Stiglitz (1987), the 
standard principal-agent problem is one where a principal (the manufacturer) is seeking a contract 
that will maximize its expected profits, given that the agent (the retailer) undertakes some set of 
actions to ma.ximize its expected profits given the compensation scheme, and that the agent is 
willing to undertake the contract (the rationality constraint). 
Fonnally, a generic version of this problem can be written down as follows for the single 
manufacturer-single retailer case (see Katz). Suppose the manufacturer produces an intennediate 
good x at a constant unit cost of cw, the good being sold to a retailer. The retailer then combines 
x with retailing inputs y at constant unit cost cr in order to sell a final good. For simplicity, 
assume that x is also the fmal good. In conducting this sale, the retailer applies some effort e, 
say advertising, which generates retailer revenues of R(x,y,e;S), where e is a demand parameter. 
e may be unobservable by the manufacturer, and e may be stochastic. If the retailer makes the 
manufacturer a payment of W(x,y,e,S), then the retailer's objective function can be written as: 
maximize e e 7tJR(x,y,e, ) - W(x,y,e, ) - cry,e; 8] 
x,y,e 
(1) 
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Given the agent's actions, the manufacturer earns: 
n:m[W(x,y,e,8) - c(x)] (2) 
Suppose that the manufacturer can make take-it-or-leave-it contract offers, then the basic 
principal-agent problem is to set a contract that induces the retailer to act in such a way as to 
maximize the sum of the expected protits of the two levels of the marketing system, and which 
also enables the manufacturer to appropriate all of these profits. The optimal contract would be 
one which satisfies the maximand: 
maximize T _ c x 
T,x,y,e w (3) 
subject to n:r[R(x,y,e; 8) - T - cry,e; 8] ~ 0 
where T-c..,x represents total expected profits in the system, and the constraint is the retailer's 
rationality constraint, i.e. the retailer will only accept the contract offered by the manufacturer 
if it earns at least its reservation level of profits, which have been normalized to zero. 
In principle, a manufacturer could offer a contract that specifies the optimal levels of x", 
y", and e" that would maximize the total protits of the vertical system, while appropriating all of 
these profits for itself. For example, the following contract could be specified: 
W (X, y, e, 9) = { 
G(8) if (x,y,e) = (x ·,y ·,e "), 
G0 , otherwise 
where G(S) satisfies n:r[R(x ·,y ·,e ·,e) - G(S) -cry ·(e),e ·ce);8] = O,a.nd G0 < 0 
i.e. the retailer either receives the reservation level of profits if there is contract compliance, or 
incurs a penalty. However, as Katz points out, such a contract is highly infeasible, largely 
because of the monitoring and enforcement costs. 
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Much of the theory of vertical restraints in fact deals with cases that Rey and Tirole 
(1986a) have termed control environments. These are a class of the principal-agent problem 
where there is no exogenous uncertainty about the environment when the contract is signed. and 
so risk aversion on the part of principal and agent is irrelevant and there are no problems of 
"shirking" on the part of the retaile~. In a control environment, several variables have to be 
solved for in the vertical structure, e.g. the quantity of x sold, wholesale and retail prices P"' and 
Pr, promotional effort e, and franchise fees g. Those variables that can be observed and put in 
the contract are defined as instruments, and the control problem is to achieve a particular 
target(s) using a sufficient set of instruments, i.e. the set of instruments that will just maximize 
vertical profits, where vertical profits are those that would arise either if all variables were 
costlessly observable and specified in the contract, or the manufacturer were vertically integrated 
with the retailer (Mathewson and Winter, 1984). 
The key to the contracrual problem then is the need on the part of the manufacturer to 
overcome the existence of vertical externalities between the two stages of the marketing chain 
(Rey and Tirole, 1986a; Katz). The actions of one party affects the profits of both manufacturer 
and retailer. although each party makes decisions only in terms of their own expected profits. 
This is best illustrated with reference to the well-known issue of double marginalization 
(Spengler, 1950). As a benchmark, suppose that the manufacturer and retailer were vertically 
integrated, the price of the final good would be P; which maximizes profits of the vertical 
system, ttv=(P;-c..,)x\ where, for simplicity, other retailing inputs y, effort e, and the demand 
parameter a have been suppressed. 
3 Rey and Tirole (1986a) comment that even in the principal-agent literature, where uncert:linty about agent 
actions is nonnally assumed, the control problem is usually rather trivial. 
p 
P:r 
V I 
P:r, Pw 
0 
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Figure 1: Double Marginalization 
MRr Dr 
X 
In Figure 1, Jtv are given by the area (B+C), where MR is the marginal revenue curve 
at retail, and c.., are the internal t:ransfer costs. In contrast, in the non-integrated structure, the 
manufacturer could offer a linear price contract W(x)=P ~x. Given this contract, the retailer 
maximizes profits 1tr=CPr-P ~)x', area A in Figure 1. In addition, the manufacturer charges a 
wholesale price P.>c.., in order to maximize profits, area B in Figure 1, which exceeds the 
transfer price of c . .., under vertical integration. Therefore, because of the two ma.rginalizations by 
manufacturer and retailer, the non-integrated retail price exceeds the integrated price, P r>P;. 
In both the vertical restraints and principal-agent literature4, it is a basic proposition that 
with retail prices as the only target of vertical control, a simple two-part tariff will resolve this 
4 See Shavell (1979) and Sappington (1991) for a discussion of the principal-agent literature relating to the 
sharecropper problem. 
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externality without the need for vertical integration. Suppose the retailer is offered a contract 
W(x)=g+P wx, where P .,.,=c.,.,, and the franchise fee g=(P;-P "')x, so that the retailer is the residual 
claimant of aggregate vertical prot1ts, i.e. the retailer is able to capture any additional vertical 
profits due to its actions. By charging the retailer the marginal cost of the intermediate input, 
the retailer is induced to take the decision that maximizes vertical profits, i.e. xv is chosen and 
the franchise fee and the wholesale price are sufficient instruments5• 
If for some reason two-part tariffs are infeasible (Gallini and Winter, 1983), then resale 
price maintenance (RPM) can also be used to resolve the double marginalization issue, because 
the retail price is fixed at P;, and the intermediate good is also sold at P~. so that the retailer 
makes zero profit, but the manufacturer appropriates all the vertical profit. In addition, note that 
either the use of vertical restraints or vertical integration here will generate a Pareto welfare 
improvement, as the final retail price will be lower6• 
(ii) Extensions of the Simple Model 
The above analysis can easily be extended to the case of multiple retailers, following the 
seminal analysis of Mathewson and Winter (1984, 1986). Given a standard spatial, retail market 
structure, each retailer buys the manufacturer's good x at the wholesale price P .,.., and applies 
other retailing inputs y in fixed proportions at constant unit cost cr> where the good x is produced 
at unit cost c.., by a single manufacturer. At each retail location, effort e is expended in order 
5 This result also holds under uncertainty where the retailer is risk neutro.l (see Sappington). 
6 The likely effects of vertical integration on economic welfare have been subject to a good deal of attention in 
the literature. If the downstream technology is one of fixed proportions, it is expected that vertical integration will 
result in a fall in fmal output price, except where the downstream industry is either competitive or where vertical 
integration results in iru::reased horizonm.I concentration downstream. In the c::lSe of variable proportions, fln.al output 
price is expected to fall. except in the c::lSe of increased horizontal concentration downstream (Waterson 1982; Abiru, 
1988). See Hart and Tirole (1990) for further analysis. 
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to inform consumers of the good, and some pan of this effort a may spill over into other 
locations. This effort, which cannot be observed costlessly by the manufacturer, is in the form 
of advertising. Free entry into retailing ensures that zero profits are made in equilibrium. 
Just as in the single manufacturer/single retailer case, :vtathewson and Winter (1984) show 
that a simple linear price contract with respect to the wholesale price will not be sufficient to 
maximize the profits of the vertical system. As the manufacturer is a monopolist, it sets prices 
in excess of unit cost, P ...,>c..,, and the retailers set price above the vertically integrated price, 
P r>P;. In addition, retailers advertise too little, an effect that is increased when there are 
advertising spillovers in retailing. The intuition of this result is straightforward. When retailers 
set the final price for x and expend effort on advertising, they know that either lowering the retail 
price and/or advertising more will result in the manufacturer appropriating the increase in profits 
due to the fact that the wholesale price exceeds the manufacturer's costs, i.e. the retailers are not 
the residual claimants. 
In the case of no advertising spillovers, Mathewson and Winter (1984) show that a simple 
two-part tariff will be a sufficient instrument to remove the vertical externality. As before, each 
retailer is offered a contract W(x)=g+P ..,x. where P ..,=c.., and g is the franchise fee. Essentially, 
the wholesale price set at cost c.., induces the retailers to set the optimal retail price and 
advertising levels, and the manufacturer appropriates the protits through the franchise fee. The 
consumer will also benefit from lower retail prices. 
In the case of advertising spillovers, the manufacturer will have to use both a franchise 
fee and RPM as instruments of vertical control. This follows from the fact that even if the 
manufacturer sets P ..,=c..,, the retailers will still advertise too little when a>O. Therefore, in this 
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case, the manufacturer simultaneously sets a wholesale price P ..,<cw in order to induce more 
advertising, and, because the retail price will be too low, specifies the optimal retail price P;, and 
extracts the profits with the franchise fee. Again, retail prices will be lower, even in the presence 
of retail price maintenance. 
The above results indicate that instruments of vertical control, such as RPM, will be 
necessary to remove the double marginalization externality if either simple two-pan tariffs are 
infeasible or because there are additional targets of vertical control such as advertising. In 
addition, O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) note that the use of vertical controls such as RPM and 
territorial restrictions may also occur because of demand and cost uncertainty. To get a sense 
of the role of uncertainty, the framework developed in Rey and Tirole (1986a, 1986b) and Tirole 
(1989) is outlined. Consider a vertical market structure where a single, risk-neutral manufacturer 
produces good x at constant unit cost cw, which is supplied to a retailing sector made up of two 
firms chosen from a competitive supply of retailers. The retailers, who are either risk-neutral or 
risk-averse, combine good x with other retailing inputs y at a constant unit cost cr, demand for 
x being given by the function x(Pr,9)=9-Pr> where 9 is a demand parameter. In setting a comract, 
the manufacturer can observe the wholesale price P . .., and the amount of x delivered to the retailer, 
but the demand parameter 9 and retailing costs cr cannot be observed. In contrast, the retailer 
may get information about 9 and cr after the contract is signed. As a result of this information 
asymmetry, there may be retailer moral hazard. 
Given this setting, the focus is on three possible vertical market arrangements. First. if 
there is Bertrand competition between the retailers, then, whatever the state of nature, the retail 
price is Pr=Ccr+P ..... ) in equilibrium, franchise fees are zero and the manufacturer charges a 
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wholesale price that would induce the retail monopoly price. Second, the manufacturer could 
assign exclusive territories to the retailers, and charge a wholesale price P.,..=c.,.. so that each 
retailer acts as a monopolist in its assigned market, the rents being appropriated with a fixed fee. 
Third. the manufacturer could use RP!\11 to set the retail price at the monopoly level, sell the good 
x at marginal cost cw, and extract the rents with a franchise fee. 
With uncertainty, these restraints are not necessarily equivalent. In the case of retailer 
risk neutrality, the manufacturer would prefer the arrangement of exclusive territories to either 
competition or RPM. With exclusive territories, the manufacturer maximizes expected vertical 
profits by charging a wholesale price P ..,=c...,, and then delegates the pricing decision to the retailer 
who can adapt to uncertainty without being constrained either by the manufacturer, as in the case 
of RPM, or the other retailer in the case of competition. In contrast, neither RPM nor 
competition are as effective at achieving this objective. In the case of competition, the retail 
price is entirely determined by cost, and is unresponsive to the demand parameter 9, while for 
RPM, the retail price is fixed before the uncertainty is resolved, and so is not adapted to either 
cost or demand conditions. 
In the case of retailer risk aversion, there is a need to provide the retailer with some 
insurance, because any increase in retailer risk reduces the level of the franchise fee that the 
manufacturer can set. It turns out that competition is likely to be the most preferred arrangement. 
This results from the fact that Bertrand competition provides perfect insurance under both cost 
and demand uncertainty, i.e. neither retailer makes positive profits. RPM also provides perfect 
insurance in the case of demand uncertainty if the retailer cost cr is known, because the 
manufacturer can force the level of retailer profits to zero, however, with uncertainty about cr> 
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RPM provides no insurance to the retailer, and will, therefore, be dominated by competition and 
exclusive territories. In the case of exdusive territories with demand uncertainty, if the wholesale 
price is set equal to wholesale costs, the retailer bears all the risk, and, therefore, the 
manufacturer has to raise the wholesale price in order to reduce the extent of retailer profit risk. 
Recent papers by O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) indicate 
that even in the absence of uncertainty, two-part t::ui.ffs may fail to ma.xirnize vertical profits if 
competing retailers do not observe each others' supply contracts, i.e. there is no public 
commitment by the manufacturer to a retail contract. In particular, with unobservable contracts, 
a manufacturer and retailer can increase bilateral profits by reducing the transfer, and hence the 
retail price, shifting profits away from other retailers. Such opportunism can lead to retail prices, 
and, hence, joint profits being below the vertically integrated level in equilibrium. O'Brien and 
Shaffer show that, given a single manufacturer and multiple Bertrand retailers, the problem of 
vertical control can be resolved by using either exclusive territory restraints or resale price 
maintenance. 
(2) Further Analysis of Vertical Restraints 
(i) Facilitation of Collusion 
A key characteristic of the simple two-pan tariff story and its generalization by 
Matthewson and Winter (1984) is that vertical restraints, aimed at removing vertical externalities 
such as the double marginalization problem, can enhance efficiency. However, it is also possible 
that vertical restraints may be aimed at reducing competition at either the manufacturing or the 
retailing level, and, hence, may not be socially desirable if collusion is facilitated at either one 
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or both levels (Rey and Stiglitz, 1988). The ambiguity in the theory is best highlighted with 
reference to the restraints of e;rclusive dealing and exclusive territories. The former is designed 
to prevent a retailer from selling other manufacturers' products, and, hence, to reduce inter-brand 
competition. The latter is aimed at reducing intra-brand competition by restricting the 
geographical area over which a retailer can sell the manufacturer's product. 
In the case of exclusive dealing, the traditional argument has been that exclusive dealing 
arrangements are aimed atforec!osing other manufacturers from distributing their brands through 
the relevant retailer(s), which forces the excluded manufacturers to utilize less efficient retailing 
outlets (Comanor and Frech, 1985). Another strand of the literature shows that exclusive dealing 
can be efficiency enhancing if it eliminates an inter-brand externality that exists when a 
manufacturer provides services or investments to a retailer, i.e. if a retailer carries other brands, 
the manufacturers of those brands will benefit from the services, and a free-rider problem arises, 
and thus manufacturers under-invest in such services (Marvel, 1982; Besanko and Perry, 1993). 
Rey and Stiglitz argue that the literature on the efficiency-enhancing effects of vertical 
restraints tends to ignore the effect such restraints can have on competition at both stages of the 
marketing chain. In order to illustrate this, a result due to Bonanno and Vickers (1988) is 
outlined. Consider a situation where manufacturing consists of a duopoly selling differentiated 
goods to a downstream duopoly retailing sector, and, at each stage, firms play a Nash game in 
prices. Suppose each manufacturer delegates one retailer to sell their good (i.e. exclusive 
dealing). The situation where the retailers compete with each other is compared to that where 
manufacturers combine exclusive dealing with a two-part tariff to induce collusion amongst the 
retailers. 
Figure 2: Food Retailing Duopoly 
pI 
a 
R , 
a 
-1 R, 
-, P, p' a 
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Assume initially that the franchise fee is zero, and that each manufacturer sets a wholesale 
price equal to marginal cost. Given this. neither food retailer can credibly raise the retail price 
beyond the ~ash level as they will be undercut by the other finn, the standard Bertrand result. 
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. R~ i.lre the initial retailer reaction functions, giving the 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium at e. For analytical purposes, these are drawn for the case of retail 
prices equal to marginal cost which coincides with the case of efficient transfer prices when a 
manufacturer and retailer are vertically integrated. 
However, setting the instrument of a linear wholesale price equal to marginal cost does 
not maximize vertical profits, because of competitive pricing by the retailers. Suppose that 
manufacturer 1 raises its wholesale price beyond marginal cost, which is credible given that it 
has an exclusive dealing arrangement with the retailer. This shifts retailer 1 's reaction function 
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to R~, the new Bertrand-Nash equilibrium being ate'. This raises retailer 1 's profits which are 
appropriated by manufacturer 1 through the franchise fee. Given the nature of the stage-t"I.Vo 
game, it is also optimal for manufacturer 2 to set a 1:\Vo-part tariff with a higher price, shifting 
retailer 2's reaction function to R~, the new equilibrium being ate, the franchise fee being used 
to appropriate the increased profits of retailer 2. Therefore, in this case, the sufficient vertical 
restraint is more profitable than vertical integration. Importantly, the use of exclusive dealing 
in conjunction with a two-part tariff reduces competition at both the manufacturing and retail 
levels, and is, therefore, welfare reducing. 
In Rey and Stiglitz's model, which has a similar structure to that of Bonanno and Vickers. 
the vertical restraint is one of each retailer selling each manufacturer's product under an exclusive 
territories contract. This has the effect of reducing intra-brand competition, resulting in higher 
retail prices, the increased profits being appropriated with a fixed fee. In addition, because 
reduced competition at the retail level reduces the perceived elasticity of demand, manufacturers 
also increase wholesale prices as inter-brand competition declines. Again. there is a reduction 
in economic welfare. 
It should be noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the assumption that reaction 
functions are upward-sloping, i.e. the goods are strategic complements7• If, in fact. the goods 
are strategic substitutes, it will no longer be optimal for a retailer to accept the previous contract. 
This follows from the fact that if reaction functions slope down in price space, as one retailer 
raises price, the competing retailer will lower price, and, as a result, lowers profits for the first 
fmn. 
7 A tenninology originally due to Bulow, Ge:mkoplos and Klemperer (1985). 
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A priori, this suggests that with strategic substitutes, the wholesale contract will consist 
of a lower wholesale price and a fixed fee, which would allow the retailer to credibly pre-commit 
to lowering the retail price. The fixed fee compensates for the lower profits due to the lower 
retail price, while the shift in the reaction function results in higher profits as the other retailer 
raises price. However, the upstream firm is setting a price less than marginal cost. Vickers 
(1985) suggests that, in this type of game, the manufacturer could recover lost profits by 
extracting the additional retailing profits through a franchise fee. In addition, if both 
manufacturers were to offer such a contract, downstream profits would fall as retailers cut prices, 
but, as this has the structure of a Prisoners' Dilemma, in the absence of cooperation between 
retailers, the Nash equilibrium would be to accept such a wholesale contract. Therefore, even 
if the notion of strategic substitutes is more appealing than strategic complements, the likely 
wholesale contract would lower the profit pie to all parties. 
(ii) Retailer Bargaining Power 
So far the analysis outlined has pretty much assumed that the principal (manufacturer) is 
able to make take-it-or-leave-it contract offers to the agent (retailer), subject to a rationality 
constraint However, this ignores the possibility of any bargaining power on the part of retailers, 
in particular, the possibility that there exists increasingly scarce shelf-space. Shaffer (1991a) 
notes that new product introductions in the U.S. food sector increased from 2,600 per year in 
1978 to 10,200 per year in 1987, at the same time there has been increased use of financial 
incentives paid by food manufacturers to retailers in order to induce the laner to provide shelf 
space for and promote the sale of the manufacturers' goods. Such negative franchise fees are 
variously referred to as slotting allowances, display allowances, placement allowances, billing 
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allowances, promotional allowances, or merchandising aflowances8• These may be payments 
in cash or in kind, e.g. free goods. Regardless of the fonn, their salient characteristic is they are 
lump-sum rather than per unit payments. Even so, the payments may be repetitive, i.e., tied to 
new good introductions, re-introduction of old goods previously removed from a retailer's shelf, 
or periods of special market promotions such as end-aisle display, a.r1d local newspaper 
advertising. 
Shaffer (199la) provides an analysis of these allowances using a model similar to that of 
Bonanno and Vickers. Consider a situation where a competitive manufacturing sector sells 
homogeneous goods to a downstream retailing duopoly that is differentiated by factors such as 
location, sales personnel etc. The vertical market relationship consists of a two-stage game where 
at the first stage, each manufacturer sets a wholesale price and in the second stage, each retailer 
chooses a manufacturer as supplier and then sets a retail price. In contrast to Bonanno and 
Vickers' model, there is now direct competition between manufacturers for shelf-space such that 
they must set a price that leads to a retailer earning at least as much in profit as implied by other 
manufacturers' prices. 
In the absence of franchise fees, the resultant equilibrium of the two-stage game will be 
sub-game perfect9, i.e. manufacturers cannot raise wholesale prices beyond the Nash level of 
marginal cost. as the other finns will offer retailers a lower wholesale price, and neither retailer 
can raise the retail price beyond the Nash level as they will be undercut by the other finn. 
8 Trade sources in the U.S. suggest that such allowances account for between a third and a half of total 
promotional expenditures by food manufacturers (Advertising Age, 1987). The MIVI:C also note similar types of 
arrangement in the UK (1981, p.15). 
9 A sub-game perfect equilibrium is one where a set of strategies for each player comprises a Nash equilibrium 
for the entire game and every sub-game. It essentially rules out non-credible threats. 
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However, if there are franchise fees, a manufacturer can offer a retailer an observable10 two-pan 
tariff contract, which, in equilibrium, will constitute a higher wholesale price than previously, and 
a negative franchise fee, i.e. a retailing allowa.nce 11 • The food retailer, facing a higher 
wholesale price, can credibly commit to paying this, because the lost revenue per sale is recouped 
through the retailing allowance. However, in committing to pay the higher wholesale price, 
competition is lessened at the retail level, as the other retailer raises price which feeds back into 
higher profits. 
This result is described in Figure 2, where the direct and indirect effects of the contract 
are shown. e is again the initial equilibrium, and if a manufacturer supplying retailer 1 raises 
price above marginal cost, the new equilibrium is ate'. Retailer 1 can credibly raise price if the 
processor pays a fee that compensates for the direct effect of the loss of profits at point a. The 
indirect effect follows from the fact that as retailer l's reaction function has been shifted, retailer 
2 will also charge a higher price. Again, it will be optimal for both manufacturers to offer this 
two-part tariff so that the new equilibrium is at e. Essentially, the same result is generated as 
in the Bonanno and Vicker's case, except that it is retailers who appropriate the rents from 
reduced inter and intra-brand competition. 
Shaffer (1991a) also provides another result in his paper that highlights the possible 
inconsistency of t:.S. anti-trust policy with respect to vertical restraints, and raises the imponant 
issue of where market power lies in a vertical marketing system. Essentially, he shows that while 
RPM and slotting allowances can both facilitate collusion, the former will be less harmful to 
10 If contr.~ets were not observable, the game collapses to that without fixed fees. 
11 It is assumed that if the slotting allowance is paid, the relevant manufacturer can contractually assure that his 
good will be purchased by the retailer, i.e. cheating by the retailer is ruled out. 
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welfare than retailing allowances. Given the structure of the game, the intuition for this result 
is straightforward: as manufacturers aim to ma..ximize the profits of retailers, if both retailers are 
offered contracts with RPM, then each manufactttrer will have to specify the retail price that 
would occur in the absence of either RPM or retailing allowances, i.e. e in Figure 2. If, 
however, only retailer 1 is offered a contract with RPM, then e~ can be achieved. which 
effectively means retailer 1 acts as a Stackelberg price leader, while retailer 2 is a price follower, 
and the manufacturer(s) not using RPM has no incentive to set the wholesale price in excess of 
marginal cost, because retailer 2 will simply want to maximize profits. Clearly, prices and profits 
increase with asynunetric RPM, however, this strategy is Pareto-dominated by retailing 
allowances where prices and profits are higher. The inconsistency in U.S. anti-trust policy is that 
while RPM is per se illegal, retailing allowances are not12• 
In the absence of retailing allowances, scarce retail shelf-space may still affect the type 
of vertical contract that a manufacturer can use. For example, Shaffer (199lb) has shown that 
a two-part tariff will not be a sufficient instrument when the manufacturer sells more than one 
brand of a good, and there is limited retail shelf-space. When there are multiple brands. the 
retailer may be able to exert bargaining power through brand selection. As a result, strategic 
rents may be gained from setting one good ag:llnst another, as well as the scarcity rents from 
shelf-space. The former refers to the opportunity cost of carrying an extra brand, measured in 
terms of reduced sales of substitute brands, while the latter are the foregone profits from the most 
preferred excluded brand. 
12 Of course there may be other explanations for the existence of retailing allowances. Given the reported high 
failure rates of new food products. negative franchise fees may represent a risk-sharing device offered by the 
principal to the agent, and, hence, are not necessarily anti-competitive. 
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Essentially, extra brands of a good will only be carried if their incremental protl.t is non-
negative, i.e. a brand will be dropped if it results in foregone profits due to a reduction in sales 
of substitute brands. If a retailer is unwilling to accept rents less than the opportunity cost of any 
brand carried, brand-specific two-part tariffs will only result in the appropriation of the marginal 
contribution to retailer profits of a particular brand not all the strategic rent. Shaffer (199lb) 
shows that other vertical restraints will have to be adopted by the manufacturer in order to satisfy 
the sufficiency argument. Full-line forcing would be a sufficient constraint as the retailer is 
simply forced to carry the complete range of brands and is then charged a two-part tariff for each 
brand. Given that such a practice may be illegal, other restraints such as brand discounts and 
aggregate rebates can achieve the same objective. For example, with brand discounts, rather 
than specifying brand-specific contracts, the manufacturer charges a wholesale price equal to 
marginal cost and sets fees for each brand stocked singly, but gives a fee discount for the 
multiple stocking of brands, which reduces the retailer's benefit to the scarcity rents. Aggregate 
rebates will achieve the same objective, where the rebate is given for stocking the range of 
brands. Interestingly, both brnnd discounts and aggregate rebates were covered in the MMC 
report (1981) on vertical behavior in the UK food chain. 
(iii) Summarv 
As the selective review of the vertical restraints literature indicates, while there is a 
common theme that simple two-part tariffs will generally have to be augmented/replaced by other 
vertical restr:li.nts in order to maximize joint vertical profits, there is no widespread agreement 
among economists as to whether vertical restraints are either socially desirable or harmful. The 
conventional view, largely stemming from Mathewson and Winter (1984), is that the use of 
...,..., 
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vertical restraints is socially beneficial to the extent that the aim of such restraints is either to 
eliminate double markups, to enhance services, or to share risk. However, to the extent that 
vertical restraints facilitate collusion, they may be deemed socially undesirable (Rey and Stiglitz, 
1988). Funhermore, various vertical restraints may be substitutes for each other, hence, giving 
no prima facie case as to why some restraints should be prohibited and others regarded as 
permissible. Consequently, economic theory gives no clear guidance to policymakers and the 
courts as to how to treat such activities. 
3. Competition Policy and Vertical Restraints 
(i) Background to Competition Policy 
In light of the preceding review, it is interesting to examine how the competition 
authorities in the U.S. and the UK have considered the welfare effects of vertical restraints in the 
food industries and (if possible) the factors that have been instrumental in their decisions. The 
policing of vertical restraints varies between countries, although common to most developed 
countries is the per se illegality of resale price maintenance. In the U.S., both minimum and 
maximum RPM have been per se illegal since 1975 (see Shaffer, 1991b), and other vertical 
restraints have been historically condemned under Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 
of the Sherman Act. In recent years there seems to have been a shift away from this position. 
Shaffer (1991a) notes that in 1984, the Depanment of Justice in its amicus brief in .\1onsanto Co. 
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. argued that RPM may be unsuitable for per se treatment because of 
recent arguments in the literature that it may be an efficient restraint. Also, Department of 
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Justice guidelines published in 1985 suggest that non-price restraints be removed from the area 
of policy except in instlli'1ces where fi.rrns have a domii1ant position t_Hay and ~farris, 1991). 
Some corr1mentators, pa..'Licularly from the 'Chicago School', have even argued for the per 
se legality of vertical restraints. For example, Bark (1978), argues that the differential treatment 
of RPM and other vertical restr:llnts is inconsistent. However, despite Bark's strictures, the 'C.S. 
courts now generally use a rule of reason for vertical restr:llnts other than RPM 13 . For example, 
in the case of exclusive territories and exclusive dealing, during the 1950s and 1960s, such 
contracts were treated as illegal per se, however, federal courts now apply a rule of reason 
standard, which allows manufacturers to show that such resrraints can increase vertical efficiency 
and, hence, competition between manufacturers (Besanko and Perry, 1993). Not surprisingly, 
Bark considers this legal distinction between price and non-price vertical restraints as 
inconsistent. 
In the case of the UK, vertical restraints are covered by various pieces of legislation. 
Price restraints come under the 1976 Resale Prices Act., such that minimum resale price 
maintenance is essentially per se illegal, although maximum resale price maintenance is not. 
Non-price restraints are dealt with under the 1973 Fair Trading Act, and its extension in the 1980 
Competition Act which introduced the concept of anti-competitive practices such as full-line 
13 The Schwinn (1967) and Sylvania (1977) cases formed the basis for the Supreme Court's current position on 
vertical restr:lints such as exclusive territories. In the former case, the Schwinn bicycle company was charged with 
violating Section 1 of the Shennan Act through its use of resale price maintenance and exclus1ve territory 
arrangements. Interestingly, while the Supreme Court found against both practices, the ruling suggested that the 
Court was uncomforeilile at treating non-price vertical restraints as per se illegal (Bark. p.282). The latter case, 
however, effectively overruled the Schwinn ruling. Sylvania, a manufacturer of television sets, was charged with 
violating the Schwinn ruling by operating a retail franchise system along with exclusive territories for the franchisees. 
However, on appeal. the Supreme Court rejected the earlier Schwinn ruling on the grounds that non-price vertical 
restrictions such as exclusive territories had not been shown to huve a detrimental effect on competition. In particular 
the Court felt that while such a restraint might reduce intra~brand competition, it would also stimulate inter~brand 
competition. 
24 
forcing and tie-ins. However, as Hay J.nd :Vforris (1991) point out, such practices are only ruled 
on if deemed against the public interest in o. monopoly investigation by :he .\{:VIC, i.e. they are 
not per se illegal and are dealt with on a case-by-c:1se basis. 
Information on the incidence a..'1d practice of vertical restra.i.nts is often difficult to obtain 
as negotiations between manufacturers and retailers ta..lce place largely in private. Therefore, 
reviewing competition policy decisions is really the only way to get an empirical handle on the 
prevalence and type of vertical restr.:lints used in the food industry. This is relatively easy in the 
case of the l.JK, as competition policy is conducted by a quasi-governmental organization that 
reports its findings. Due to the nature of this system, it is straightfon.vard to be sure the survey 
of cases is comprehensive. However, in the case of the U.S., vertical restraints are dealt with 
tr.rough the cotlf""..s, requiring reviews of court proceedings through on-line legal information 
systems such as Lexis-Nexis. Therefore, at this stage, this paper presents only an incomplete 
survey of such cases in the U.S. food industry. This exercise also provides an informal 
assessment on the consistency between the recent theoretical contributions and the decisions 
reached by the competition authorities. The results of these surveys are presented in the 
following two sections. 
(ii) Vertical Restraints in the U.S. Food Sector 
This section considers the rulings made by U.S. courts on vertical restraints in the U.S. 
food system. Table 1 lists a series of cases for the period 1972 to 1991 which :u-e drawn from 
a search made of the Nexis-Lexis on-line legal information system. This system reportS the 
rulings of federal and district courts on a variety of issues, including anti-trust cases. In order 
to keep this case-study manageable, the search string chosen was based on the Topco (1972) case, 
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a landmark ruling in the food industry that highlighted :.til important distinction the U.S. cou..rts 
draw betvi!een restraints that are purely vertica.l ai1d those aimed at restricting horizontal 
competition 14• It should be recognized though that this search stntegy is likely to have 
generated some sample selection bias. 
The search found 453 cases that cited the Topco case, of which seventeen cases related 
to t..~e food industry. Due to the court-based system of anti-trust policy in the U.S., Lexis-Nexis 
gives a complete report of the court's deliberations, including the basis of t..l-te plaintiff's 
complaint, the defendant's position, and the court's ruling which usually cites precedent from 
previous cases and whether the restraint in question can be ruled on either a per se or rule of 
reason basis. The salient features of these proceedings are reported in Table 1. A number of 
observations can be made about these cases: 
(a) First, of the seventeen cases, fourteen have involved either the distribution and 
marketing of branded alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages or some fonn of franchised retailing, 
both of which can be considered as typical principal-agent relationships between upstream and 
downstream flnns. 
(b) Second, from column 1 in the table, which lists the principal fonn of restraint being 
used by the defendant firm, it can be seen that most of the classic fonns of vertical restraint have 
been investigated by the courts in the case of the U.S. food industry: exclusive territories, 
exclusive dealing, refusals to supply/deal, retail price maintenance, tying arrangements and 
franchise fees, with exclusive territories being the most common, appearing in fourteen of the 
seventeen cases. Interestingly, unlike the MMC investigations in the UK which are discussed 
14 The authors are indebted to Howard Marvel for suggesting this particular line of search, and n.lso for his advice 
on accessing the Lexis-Nexis system. 
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in the next section, none of the cases involve discounts by upstream fmns to downstream flrms. 
This may either reflect the fact that such cases would be dealt with under the Robinson-Patman 
Act or, as noted earlier, because discounts in the form of retailing allowances are currently not 
illegal per se. 
(c) Third, the court rulings and commentary, as listed in columns 2 and 3, have followed 
the precedents set by the Schwinn and Sylvania cases referred to earlier. Prior to 1977, both 
retail price and non-price vertical restraints were ruled as per se illegal, whereas post-1977, the 
courts have treated non-price restraints as generally not being illegal. Resale price restraints have 
remained illegal, an exception being the Liquor Corporation of New York (1986) case, where 
state law was deemed to override federal law. The standard position of the courts since the mid-
1970s on non-price vertical restraints in the food industry has been to adopt a rule of reason 
standard. Such an approach to vertical restraints was defined in the Long John Silver/Martin 
Brower (1991) case as hinging on whether the plaintiff can demonstrate that an anti-competitive 
effect has not been offset by a pro-competitive benefit. 
This shift in court rulings after 1977 is best illustrated by cases involving the beer and 
soft drinks industries. In the case of beer, the Coors (1973n4) and (1975) cases ret1ect the 
precedent set by the earlier Schwinn case whereby both price and non-price restraints were ruled 
asperse illegal. although the Supreme Coun did indicate that perhaps non-price restraints should 
be separated from price restraints in the case of "unique" products. In contrast, the Coors (1982) 
case reflects the Sylvania ruling that non-price restraints be treated on a rule of reason basis 
because reductions in intra-brand competition due to exclusive territories could be outweighed 
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by increased inter-brand competition. This seems to have become clear precedent by the time 
of the Anheuser-Busch/Mil!er Brewing (1987) case where a similar ruling was made 15. 
In the case of soft drinks, the courts have generally ruled in favor of fmns' non-price 
restraints. It seems from court decisions in this industry, that exclusive territories are regarded 
as a necessary incentive to bottlers to make investments in equipment, to market the product 
effectively, and to enhance inter-brand competition. Most importantly th<mgh, these activities 
are now expressly protected under the Soft Drinks Interbrand Competition Act (1981). This Act, 
which came about after many years of adverse decisions relating to the soft drinks industry by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), explicitly protects from prosecution under the Sherman 
Act the use of exclusive territories to make, distribute and sell soft dnn.ks that are trademarked. 
although price fixing and horizontal restraints are still deemed unlawful. Interestingly, the 
brewing industry has lobbied for a similar form of protection (Carlton and Perloff, 1990). 
(d) Fourth, court decisions in the Topco (1972) and Reese Foods (1989) cases, and other 
subsequent rulings, draw a very clear distinction between vertical restraints that are purely 
vertical and those that are designed to restrict horizontal competition. This is clear in several 
cases where the courts ruled in favor of existing restraints. For example, in the Long John 
Silver/Martin Brower (1987) case, the court cited Topco as the standard example of a vertical 
agreement designed to allocate territones in order to minimize competition, ".Vhereas the exclusive 
territories cited in the particular case were purely venical, and, hence, not per se illegal. 
15 Interestingly. in the latter C:lSe, Stiglitz argued as an expert witness that non-price vertical restraints could be 
anti-competitive, and, hence, consistent with a horizontal conspiracy. 
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In sununary, in the case of the U.S. food industry, the courts have made very consistent 
decisions concerning non-price vertical restraints since the mid-1970s, ruling that they should be 
judged by a rule of reason standard. In particular, the view of the couns is that while restraints 
such as exclusive territories reduce intra-brand competition, there is usually a concomitant 
increase in inter-brand competition due to efficiency gains. However, the couns clearly consider 
that price restraints, and those restraints that diminish horizontal competition are to be judged as 
illegal per se. 
The question then arises as to how consistent the court rulings are with the economic 
theory of vertical restraints. It would seem that the shift towards treating non-price vertical 
restraints by a rule of reason standard does reflect, at least loosely, the ambiguity in the modern 
theory of vertical restraints, i.e. in certain circumstances, vertical restraints may be efficiency 
enhancing, and so should not be ruled asperse illegal, whereas if restraints are used to restrict 
horizontal competition, they are to be treated as illegal. This type of reasoning was noted by 
Bark in his sununary of the opinion in the Sylvania case: 
''The opinion c~efully reserved the possibility that some (unspecified) applications of vertic:U restnctions 
might justify per se prohib1tion and others (also unspecified) might fall under a case-by-case examination 
of competitive effects." (p.287). 
(iii) Vertical Restraints in the UK Food Sector16 
This section considers the UK MMC's decisions on the use of vertical restraints in the 
UK food sector17• Information compiled from the eighteen investigations into the food 
16 This section draws on an e~lier paper by McCorriston (1994). 
17 Not all of the investigations reported in Table 2 were conducted by the M.MC; a small number of cases 
between 1978 and 1979 were considered by the Price Commission. However, for convenience, it will be a.sswned 
in the discussion that all investigations were carried out by the MMC. 
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industries, covering the period from 1976 to 1994, is summarized in Table 2. The information 
obtained from these reports gives details not only on the form of vertical restraints used and the 
level of discounts given to retailers, but also factors which were apparently instrumental in the 
MMC reaching its final decisions. 
Column 1 lists the main form of discounts used in the eighteen industries investigated. 
The most common forms were quantity discounts, overriders and special prices (i.e. discounts 
related to the total size of the retailer's account). Special promotions also featured in a large 
number of cases while the supply of equipment was important in the ice-cream and frozen-food 
industries. Exclusive dealing and tying have been used in the beer and carbonated drinks 
industries. 
The MMC s reports also give information on the extent of the discount This is recorded 
in column 2 which shows that there was a large variation in the level of discounts across 
industries ranging from 5 percent in cigarettes to 35 percent in the flour and bread industry. The 
average (unweighted) level of discount was around 17 percent. Some MMC reports also give 
an indication of the costs of these discounts as a percentage of manufacturer's turnover. Again 
there was wide variation ranging from only 0.4 percent in cigarettes to 35 percent in the flour 
and bread industry. 
Of interest to the MMC in their investigations has been the relative bargaining power 
between manufacturers and retailers. This is important in the context of the game played out in 
the theoretical literature which generally assumes that the manufacturers are the principals and 
retailers the agents. One proxy for market power in the manufacturing sector is the concentration 
ratio. In most of the MMC's investigations this was high with many industries recording the 
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relevant n-fmn concentration ratio in excess of 90 percent (see column 4). However, in the 
evidence provided by manufacturers to the ~fyfC, when asked to justify the use and level of 
discounts, they cited the bargaining power of some retailers. This, as Shaffer (1991a) suggests, 
may not be just due to the number and market share of retailers, but also due to limitations on 
shelf-space relative to the number of new products. Whether this was deemed relevant in the 
various investigations is noted in column 5. In eleven of the eighteen industries investigated, this 
was considered to be a key factor in detennining the level of manufacturers' discounts. This also 
raises the question as to whether the theoretical models capture adequately manufacturer/retailer 
interactions, at least as far as the UK food sector is concerned. 
Finally of concern to the MMC was whether such discounts were discriminatory in nature. 
In this case, the MMC had to assess whether the discounts given could be justified on cost 
considerations; if not, they would be regarded as discriminatory. The MMC's assessments for 
each investigation is recorded in column 6. The evidence shows that, in almost all cases, 
discounts were deemed to be discriminatory with the exception of discounts given in the biscuit 
and cigarette industries. 
In certain countries, evidence of discrimination would be sufficient to rule such practices 
illegal. This is not necessarily the case in the UK, as is evident from the MMC's decisions 
reported in column 7. Interestingly, the :v!MC ruled that, in many cases, the discounts, albeit 
discriminatory, were passed on in lower prices to consumers. In essence, these decisions suggest 
that while discounts used in the UK food sector could potentially harm competition in retail 
markets, this would not necessarily be commensurate with lower consumer welfare. Of the 
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twenty decisions made by the MMC, in only nine cases were the use of vertical restraints deemed 
harmful to consumer welfare. 
Given the informal basis of the evaluation of the MMC's investigations as they relate to 
the food sector in the UK, it is difficult to come to any clear-cut conclusion. No obvious pattern 
emerges in identifying a consistent set of factors on which the MMC based its decisions. While 
more formal analysis is awaited, the most that can be said is that the lack of consistency in the 
MMC' s decisions mirrors the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the welfare effects of 
such vertical market practices. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, this paper has considered interactions bet'Neen (rather than within) different 
stages of a vertical marketing system from both a theoretical and competition policy perspective. 
Vertical restraints, which are a departure from the nonnal assumption of linear price contracts, 
can take a variety of fonns and their legislative status and policing varies between countries. 
Such restraints have only recently been subject to rigorous analysis by economists, and have 
received virtually no attention from agricultural economists interested in the food system. 
Unfortunately, as this paper illustrates, while the economics literature is rich in analysis of such 
restraints, theory gives us no unambiguous prediction about their private and social effects, and. 
hence, no agreed approach to their regulation. In particular, there is an important tension 
between restraints that increase both private and social welfare and those that increase private and 
lower social welfare. 
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This ambiguity in the theoretical literature appears to be mirrored, albeit in different ways, 
in the decisions on vertical restraints of the U.S. courts 3.I1d the UK competition authorities with 
regard to their respective food systems. In the case of the U.S., the cases reviewed covered the 
range of vertical restraints discussed in the literature, and to some extent exhibited consistent 
rulings in the sense that price restraints and restraints designed to restrict horizontal competition 
have been treated asperse illegal, while non-price restraints are not. However, the fact that such 
a distinction is made also seems to reflect the current status of the literature. In the latter case, 
there seems to be no apparent consistency in the UK MMC's decisions on whether such practices 
serve the public interest. In addition, the bulk of the MMC' s investigations have appeared to 
focus on discounts rather than the types of restraint more typically discussed in the economics 
literature. 
There is considerable scope for further research in this area. The most obvious need is 
to gauge the incidence and form of vertical restraints in European Union countries other than the 
UK. In addition, there is an interesting contrast between the type of vertical relationships 
investigated by the U.S. courts and the UK's y[\'1C which would bear funher investigation. 
Specifically, in the U.S., most of the cases surveyed seem to fit well the concept of manufacturer 
as principal and wholesaler/retailer as agent, while in the UK, the question arises as to who are 
principal and agent, and whether in fact interaction between vertical stages is better captured as 
a bilateral bargaining problem. How this affects the welfare impact of vertical contracts in the 
food system deserves further exploration. 
,. l: Court Decisions on VerticaJ Restraints in the U.S. Food Svstem 
Product/lndustry 
Privale-Label Groceries/ 
Cooperative Association ai 
Retailers 
Beer/Beer Distribution 
Maxwell Hoose Coffee/ 
Wholes.alin g and 
Institutional Buyers 
Lemon-Lime Soft Drin.lts/ 
Bottling and Distribution ai 
Soft Drinks 
Beer/Beer Distribution 
Soft Drinks/Bottling and 
Distribution of Soft Drinla 
Winc:tWine Wholesaling 
Beer/Beer Wholesale and 
Retail Distribution 
lee-Cream/Licensed 
Manufacture and 
Franchised Retailing 
Waffles/Waffle House 
Franchising 
Liquor/Li~uor Wholesaling 
and Retailmg 
Beer/Beer Distribution 
Soft Drinks/Bottling and 
Distribution of Soft Drin.lts 
Fried Chicken/Popeyes 
Franchising 
Fast Food/Burger !Gng 
Franchising 
Spices and Gourmet 
Foods/Wholesaling and 
Distribution 
Frozen Fish/Wholesaling 
and Loog John Silver 
Franchising 
Year of Final 
Ruling 
1972 
1973/4 
1975 
1975 
1975 
1976 
1980 
1982 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1991 
Defendant 
Topco 
Coors 
General 
Foods 
Coca-Cola 
Coors 
Coca-Cola 
Mid Cal 
Aluminum 
Coors 
Baskin and 
Robbins 
Waffle 
House 
Liquor 
C01poration 
of New York 
Anheuser 
Busch 
Miller 
Brewing 
Pepsi-Cola 
Popeyes 
Burger !Gng 
Reese Finer 
Foods 
Long John 
Silver/ 
Martin 
Brower 
Source: Lexis-Nexis on-line legal information system. 
Principal Fonn of 
Restr:Unt 
(1) 
Exclusive Territories 
Resale Price Mainlena.nce 
Exclusive Dealing 
Exclusive Territories 
Rdusal to Supply 
Resale Price Maintenance 
Refusal to Supply 
Tying Arrangements 
Exclusive Territories 
Resale Price Maintenance 
Exclusive Territories 
Rdusal to Supply 
Exclusive Territories 
Resale Price Mainten= 
(sanctioned under 
California statute) 
Exclusive Territories 
Quality Controls 
Refusal to Supply 
Exclusive Territories 
Retailers Tied to Area 
Manufacturer md Baskin 
and Robbins Brand :"'ame 
Exclusive Territories 
Tying Arrnngements 
Termination oi Contract 
Resale Price Maintenance 
(sanctioned under :"'ew 
York Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Law) 
Exclusive Territories 
Exclusive Territories 
Refusal to Supply 
Exclusive Temtories 
Exclusive Territories 
Refusal to Deal 
Exclusive Territories 
Exclusive Dealing 
Refusal to Deal 
Court Ruling 
(2) 
Per se violation of 
Sherman Act 
FTC told Coors to desist 
from these practices. 
Supreme Court upheld 
findings as per se violation 
of the Shennan Act. 
Peru violation of 
Sherman Act 
Plaintiff's claims under the 
Sherman Act rejected. 
Resale price maintenance 
and exclusive territories 
illegal. 
:"'ot a per se violation of 
Sherman Act 
Per se violation of the 
Sherman Act 
Not a per se violation of 
Sherman Act 
Not a per se violation af 
Sherman Act 
:>lot a per se violation of 
Shem1an Act. Defensible 
under a rule of reaso11. 
:"'ot a oer se violation of 
the Sh~nnan A .. t 
:-lot a per se violation of 
Sherman Act. Defensible 
unJer a rule of reason 
:-lot per se violation of 
Shem1an Act 
:--lot a per se violation of 
Shennan Act 
Not a per se violation of 
Shennan Act. Defensible 
under rule of reason. 
Per Se Violation of 
Sherman Act 
:"'ot a per se violation of 
Shem1an Act. Defensible 
under rule of reason. 
Coou:nc:nury 
(3) 
Vertical restraint designed to ali.nimize 
horizontal competitioo. Topco deemed 
not separate from its members. 
Court considered non-price =rainu a.s 
injurious and relaled to illegal price-
fixing. While Court cited pi"CCedent of 
Schwinn case in ruling temtorial. 
restrictions illegal. fell thu sboul.d 
probably yield when it involves a 
unique product. 
Straightforward case of system 
Jestgned to control pnces. 
Coca-Cola suc=ded Ln introducing 
Spnte by competing fairly. 
Per se illegality of territorial 
restnctions should yteld to sat:uaLions 
where product is uruque. 
Boulers not limited to Coca-Cola 
products. System enhances inu:r-bra.ad 
compet1tion. 
Defense of "state a.ct.ioo" docuine 
could not override federal law. 
No evidence of reduction in inna- :md 
inter-brand competition. Re.fu.sal to 
supply simply wholesaler following 
contractual obligauon with Coon. 
:-.lo reduction in intra- and inter-brand 
competition. !ce-cre:un and tr.lodemark 
not separale, so not a tying 
arrangement. 
Ty1ng arrnngement necessary for 
product quality. Law upholds right of 
franchisor to termin.ue. 
:"'ew York law overrides feder.tllaw 
under :::I st Amendment that there is :1. 
state interest in protecting sma.i.I 
retailers. 
Vertical restramt did not reduce intra· 
brand competition at wholes.ale level. 
W auld increase inter-brand competition 
through distributional efficienac:s 
Vertical restramts prot=d wxler the 
Soft Drinks lnterbrand Ccmpem.ioo 
Act (!981 ). Restraints would .J..w 
have been lawful under a ro.ie :;f 
reason. 
Reiusal to deal was to prevent 
cannibalization of existUlg fr.wcilisees. 
Restraint increases inter-brand 
competition. 
Not defensible under rule of reason. 
Precedent of Topco ca.se. Stoc:X of 
Reese owned by Ree:se distribr.nors, 
thus a horizontal restrictioo oc 
competition. 
Agreement is a classic vertical 
agreement and not relaled to price-
fixing. Wholesaler provided L::.ag 
John Silver with efficient, competitive 
service. 
Monoj!!,lles and \1er3en Commission [)edsjons oa Vertical Ri!!»"traints ia the l:K Food Szstena1 
Justry Year of Pnncipal Fonn Size of Largest ci)U of Suucwre of Bargaining Power Evidence of Served Public 
Rulina of Rcsuaint DisCXlW1l (%) Disoount/ Upstream Stage: of Relailen 7 Discnminatioo Interest? 
Twnover (%) (%) (5) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) 
Frozen 1976 Special Prices 11.5 7.4 CR3"' 65 Yes Yes So 
Foods Quantity 
Discounts 
Sup_ply of 
Equapment 
Flour and 19TI Early Sealement 35.0 NR CR3"' 62 Yes Yes Yes 
Bread Quantity 
Discounts 
Cat and 19TI Quantity 13.5 0.7 CR2" 80 Yes Yes Yes 
Dog Food Discounts 
Ovemders 
Sugar 1978 Quantity NR SR CR3 = 91 Yes Yes ~0 
DiSCOWIU 
Specaal Prices 
Grocery 1978 Quantity NR NR CRS = 66 ~0 Yes ~0· 
ProductsJ Discounts 
Ovemders 
Ci garettesJ 1978 Quantity 15.0 NR CR2 = 92 No Yes Yes 
Dumunts 
Biscuits' 1979 Oveniden 1.5 14.0 CR2 = 49 Yes No Potent~ ally 
Special 
Promotions 
lee-Cream 1979 Retrospective 20.0 36.0 CR2= 66 Yes Yes No 
Bonus, I...oua 
for Equipmcut 
Beer 1981 Special Prices 
Oveniders 
15.0 5.3 CR5 = 81 ~0 Uncertain Yes 
Special 
Promotions 
Biscuits 1981 Special Prices 
Special 
Promotions 
14.0 8.6 CR5= 96 Yes Yes Yes 
Cigarettes 1981 Special 5.0 0.4 CRS = 99 ~0 No Yes 
Promot1ons 
Baked 1981 :"-IR 25.0 NR CR3 = 71 Yes Yes Yes 
Beans 
Bread 1981 :"-IR 14.0 NR CRS = &2 Yes Yes Yes 
Salt 1986 Quantity 
Dismunts 
17.5 !'IR CR2 = 95 Yes Yes So 
Spec1al Pnces 
Property Loans, 
Tymg. Exclusive 
!'lA NR SR No Yes No 
Dealing 
Beer 1989 
Quantity 
Disa>unts 30.0 :-lR SR :-lo Yes So 
E~c!USIVe :-lR NR :-lo No No 
Carbonated 1990 Dealing CRZ = 65 
Dnnks 
No Yes Yes Oveniders SR. NR 
Soluble 1991 Pnce Discounts NR NR CR2:: 72 Yes Yes No 
Coffee 
Ice-Cream 1994 Oveniders 6.0 6.0 CR3 = 92 No Yes Yes 
Supply of 
Equ1pmen1 
1 All decisions by MMC anless Olherwise stated. 
l Concentration ratios at time of mvestigation. 
J Investigation by Price Commission. 
NR • oot reported.. 
NA • not applicable. . 
Soorce: Compiled from Monopol.ies and Mergers Commission Reports (various) and Price Commission Reports (vanous). 
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